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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT
0 F T'HE STATE OF UTAH
1

JAMES P. KNUCKLES,
Plaintiff-Respondent.
vs.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMP ANY, a corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.

12254

BRIEF O·F AP'P'ELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
The appeal concerns the right of plaintiff-respondent
to recover under the terms of a group death and dismemberment insurance policy because of an eye injury.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT'
The lower court held in favor of plaintiff ruling
that plaintiff had suffered the "total and irrecoverable
loss of sight of one eye" within the meaning of the
group insurance policy.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant - appellant seeks reversal of the lower
court's decision.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case are relatively simple and
undisputed.
On February 23, 1967, while he was operating an
ore loading machine at his place of employment, plaintiff was struck in the right eye by a foreign object.
(Tr. at 8) The foreign object penetrated the crystalline
lens of the eye causing a traumatic cataract or opaqueness of the lens to form. (Deposition of James P. Rigg,
Sr. at 9-12.) Between February 27, 1967 and March 1,
1968, plaintiff underwent three operative procedures to
remove completely the crystalline lens. (Id. at 14-20.)
Plaintiff's physician furnished plaintiff with a contact
lens for the injured eye, together with a bifocal forward
lens. (Deposition of Robert 'N. Rigg at 6; Tr. at 15.)
During 1969, plaintiff had two surgical procedures performed to correct a muscle imbalance in his injured
eye. (Deposition of James P. Rigg, Sr. at 10.)
At the present time plaintiff's injured eye is physiologically normal except for the loss of the crystalline
lens and a slight scar on the cornea. (Deposition of
James P. Rigg, Sr. at 25.) Plaintiff's physician testified
that with the corrective lenses, plaintiff has essentially
normal vision or 20/20 minus three visual acuity. (Id.
at 27.) Without correction, plaintiff can see large object~,
lightness and darkness. However, the naked eye is of
little practical use to plaintiff. (Tr. at 11, 39.)

2
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Plaintiff was insured as an employee of Texas Gulf
Sulphur Company under a group insurance policy with
defendant for accidental death or dismembe,rment. The
policy provided for payment to the insured of a specified amount in the event the insured suffered the "total
and irrecoverable loss of sight of one eye." (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1, at 3.)
After the hearing in this matter, the lower court
held that the plaintiff had suffered the "total and irrecoverable loss of sight of one eye" within the meaning
of the subject policy, reasoning that plaintiff had lost
the practical use of his eye and that the effect of artificial lenses on plaintiff's sight need not be taken into
consideration. (Tr. at 42-44; paragraph 3 of Order dated
September 14, 1970.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS ENTIRE CASE INVOLVES A QUESTION
OF LAW.

The basic issue m this case is an issue of law;
namely, whether plaintiff has snffered the total and
irrecoverable loss of sight within the meaning of the
subject policy when he enjoys normal vision with the
aid of corrective lenses. At trial, there was no dispute
that because of the removal of the crystalline lens, plaintiff's naked eye is of little practical use to him. It was
also undisputed that with the corrective lenses prescribed
by his physician, plaintiff's vision in the injured eye is
essentially normal. On the basis of these undisputed

3
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facts, the lower court reached its decision based on its
interpretation of the applicable law. Because this case
presents a legal que·stion, the lower court's interpreta..
tion of the law carries with it no presumptive validity.
This Court is the proper and ultimate tribunal to decide
the question of law on which this case turns.
POINT II
THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE SUBJECT INSURANCE POLICY DEFEATS PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY.

Insurance contracts "are subject to the same construction as any other contract, in accordance with the
expressed intent of the parties." Utah Farm Bureau
Ins. Co. v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 402, 315 P.2d 277,
279 (1957). Although there is a rule that doubt or ambiguity in a contract of insurance is to be continued in
favor of the insured and against the insurer, see Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States,
94 Utah 532, 543-45, 72 P.2d 1060, 1065-66 (1937), the
rule does not have the effect of "making a plain contract doubtful or ambiguous and then interpreting it in
favor of the insured." Home Life Ins. Co. of New York
v. Stewart, 114 F.2d 516, 517 (10th Cir. 1940). No
forced or strained meaning will be given to words that
is contrary to the obvious intent of the parties, Sump
v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 21 Mich. App. 160,
175 N.W.2d 44, 46 (1970). The natural and obvious
meaning of the provisions in a contract is to be adopted
in preference to a fanciful, curious or hidden meaning.
Home Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Stewart, supra at 517.

4
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In order to be entitled to coverage, plaintiff's loss
of sight in his injured eye must be "total and irrecoverable." These terms are not indefinite or ambiguous.
See Sump v. St. Paul Fire and Marines Ins. Co., supra;
Bolich v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 205 N.C. 43,
169 S.E. 826, 828 (1933). Webster defines "total" as
meaning "complete," "utter," or "absolute." Irrecoverable is defined as meaning "not capable of being recovered, regained, remedied or rectified." (Webster's New
International Dictionary (2d ed. 1943).) In light of these
definitions, plaintiff's loss of sight is neither total nor
irrecoverable.
Plaintiff is not blind in his injured eye. (Tr. at 39.)
His e,ye is physiologically normal except for the loss
of the crystalline lens. (Deposition of James P. Rigg,
Sr. at 25.) He can see large objects and darkness and
light. (Tr. at 11.) Therefore, his loss of sight is not
complete, utter or absolute.
Moreover, plaintiff's impairment of vision has been
virtually restored by surgery and by the use of a small
contact lens. The extent of sight recovery is candidly
detailed by plaintiff's physician, Dr. James P. Rigg, Sr.,
in his correspondence to the company physican of plaintiff's employer, Dr. James Alexander:
James Alexander, M.D.
Moab, Utah 4-10-67
P.S. It was a pleasure to see James Knuckles
again a few days ago. ~ith a corre~tio~, h~ r~a~
about 20/80 with the right eye which is s1gmfi-
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cantly good. I believe that eventually with a contact lens he will have almost normal vision.
J.P.R.

James Alexander, M.D.
Moab, Utah

April 24, 1967

My dear Alex:
You will be amazed - James Knuckles, with a
correction, read 20/20 today. I see no reason
why he should not return to work at your discretion. We would like to evaluate him in three
weeks; but it should be another six or eight weeks
before contact lens can be prescribed. Naturally,
he will have protective safety glasses.
Jubilantly yours,
James P. Rigg, Sr., M.D.

JPR:gf
James Alexander, M.D.
Re: James Knuckles
May 6, 1967

James Knuckles was in a day or two ago. He
is doing all right, but a little capsular remnant
has floated into the direct line of vision. But
I could still get 20/25 visual acuity. This is gratifyingly good. It will be necessary, however, to
hold up the contact lens for at least anotl~er
month or two. We are, however, gratified \nth
his progress.
Most sincerely,
James P. Rigg, Sr., :M.D.

JPR:gf
fi
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J arnes Alexander, M.D.
Moab, Utah

December 9, 1967

My dear Alex:
J arnes Paul Knuckles is fantastic. He read 20/15
with his right eye with the contact lens and a
small correction in the rayban. This is spectacular. There [sic] little fleck of cortex which I had
visualized which was partially obstructing has
apparently resorbed. We think this is marvelous.
Again wishing you and your lovely family and
[sic] great Yuletide Season, I am,
Most sincerely yours,
James P. Rigg, Sr., M.D.

JPR:gf

March 4, 1968
James Alexander, M.D.
Moab, Utah
My dear Alex:
We did a discission on Paul Knuckles and split
a capsular membrane which had formed. The
day following surgery with his contact lens he
read 20/15 - phenomenal, colossal and beyond
anticipated hopes!
Most sincerely,
James P. Rigg, Sr., M.D.
JPR:gf
(Letters marked at Exhibit 1 to and identified in the
Deposition of James P. Rigg, Sr., (see Rigg's Deposition
at 29).)
7
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In a letter to plaintiff dated March 4 1968
Rigg stated:
'
' Dr.
March 4, 1968

Mr. Paul Knuckles
Box 643
Moab, Utah
My dear Paul:

I~ was thr~lling to see you the other day and the
visual acmty with the contacts was stupendous
colossal and great; besides being good.
'

Wishing you the very best, I am,
Most sincerely yours,
James P. Rigg, Sr., M.D.
(Id.) Through modern medical science, plaintiff has
essentially normal vision. Plaintiff's loss of sight has
been recovered, remedied and rectified within the meaning of the policy.
The lower court recognized that under the policy
there must be an effort made to restore sight but
attempted to distinguish between sight recovered by
surgical methods and sight recovered through "artificiaF'
means such as lenses. Such a distinction is not warranted
by the plain meaning of the policy. The term '' irrecoverable" is not specifically limited in the policy to the
recovery of vision merely through surgical procedures.
The policy does not differentiate among various procedures, designed to restore vision such as eye exercises,
medication, corrective lenses and surgery. The policy
merely refers to "irrecoverable" loss of sight. Physicians
specializing in treatment of the eye are trained not only
8
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in surgical procedures but also in the prescribing of
medication, corrective lenses and eye exercises. (See Tr.
at 32.) If the policy requires that an insured submit to
modern surgical techniques to restore vision, it should
also require the wearing of lenses that are prescribed
by the very doctors performing the surgery. To disregard the effect of the contact lens on plaintiff's vision
is to ignore significant, optical advancements and to
emphasize surgical advancements only. Plaintiff's own
physician testified that the post-surgical use of contact
lenses with individuals suffering from a traumatic cataract has been greatly developed during the last ten to
fifteen years and is now common practice. (Deposition
of James P. Rigg, Sr. at 35-36.) The effect of modern
medical procedure is to replace the crystalline lens of the
eye with a comparable-sized contact lens on the outside of
the eye. Thus, cataract patients can now have normal
vision and lead normal lives through the progress of
science. Today millions of persons wear glasses and
contact lenses comfortably, and they are not considered
handicapped or disabled. (Tr. at 32-33.) Therefore, on
the basis of the plain meaning of the insurance contract, there is no rational basis for the lower court's
distinction.
The policy itself is entitled: "Insurance for Death
or Dismemberment by Accidental Means." (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1, at 3.) (Emphasis added.) The schedule of
losses in the policy explicitly details the losses for which
insurance was contemplated:
1. The full amount of Insurance for Death
or Dismemberment by Accidental Means in force
9
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under the Group Policy on account of the Employee at the dat~ of the accident is payable for
~ny of the foUowmg losses: loss of life, total and
irrecoverable loss of sight of both eyes, loss of
both hands by severance at or above wrist-joints
loss of both feet by severance at or above ankle~
joints, loss of one hand and of one foot by severance at or above wrist- and ankle-joints respectively, or such loss of one hand or of one foot
together with total and irrecoverable loss of sight
of one eye.
One half the amount of Insurance for Death
or Dismemberment by Accidental Means in force
under the Group Policy on account of the Employee at the date of the accident is payable for
any of the following losses: loss of one hand by
severance at or above wrist-point, loss of one
foot by severance at or above ankle-joint, or total
and irrecoverable loss of sight of one eye.

Id. By its express terms, the policy does not provide
coverage unless there is an actual severance of the body
member, or, in the case of eye injuries, unless there is
"total and irrecoverable loss of sight." The policy docs
not purport to insure for diminution of function or use.
The courts have uniformly held under identical provisions in other insurance contracts that actual severance
of the body member at the designated place is necessary.
44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance §1602 (1969). When the provisions relating to loss of sight are read in context with
the provisions relating to the other body members, it
would appear that the contracting parties were contemplating insurance for a blindness that could never be
restored, just as a severed hand or foot can never be
restored.

10
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Surely, if the plain meaning of words is to be given
effect, and if the contractual relationships that were
established on those words are to be upheld, plaintiff
is not entitled to recover under the subject policy. A
person who through medical science has recovered normal vision cannot at the same time have suffered the
"total and irrecoverable loss of sight of one eye."
POINT III
MOST OF THE DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS
THAT ARE IN POINT DENY REVOVERY TO A
CLAIMANT WHO HAS RECOVERED VI SI 0 N
THROUGH CORRECTIVE LENSES.

The trial court in the instant case erred when it
reasoned that there is a liberal interpretation applied
to insurance contracts requiring the "total and irrecoverable loss of sight" so that a person who enjoys normal
corrected vision can recover thereunder. When an insurance contract insures against "loss of sight," "loss
of entire sight," "entire loss of sight," "blindness," or
"total blindness," it is true that many courts have interpreted this language to mean that literal blindness is
not required but only the loss of practical use of sight.
See Annot., 87 A.L.R. 2d 481, 486-490 (1963). Nevertheless, there is considerable authority that has interpreted the same language to require total blindness.
E.g., Gilliland v. Order of Ry. Conductors of America,
216 Ala. 13, 112 So. 225 (1927); Sta.te Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Sewell, 223 Ga. 31, 153 S.E.2d 432
(1967); Gibson v. Combined Insurance Co. of America,
171 So. 2d 727 (La. 1965) ; Sump v. St. Paitl Fire and
Marine Ins. Co., 21 Mich. App. 160, 175 N.W.2d 44, 46
11
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(1970); Mulcahey v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainnien, 229
Mo. App. 610, 79 S.W.2d 759 (1934). However, when
the insurance contract insures against the "total (or
entire) and irrecoverable loss of sight," the courts have
uniformly denied recovery if the claimant's vision has
been restored through surgery and corrective lenses.
In Wallace v. Insurance Company of North America,
415 F. 2d 542 (6th Cir. 1969), plaintiff was insured
against the loss of an eye which was defined as the
"entire and irrecoverable loss of sight.'' Plaintiff was
struck in the right eye by a metallic object and a traumatic cataract developed. The cataract was removed
and plaintiff was fitted with a contact lens together with
glasses. Plaintiff had 20/60 vision in the injured eye
with the correction, but without the lenses could see
only about half as well as the normal eye can see under
clear water. Plaintiff's vision deteriorated somewhat
because of the formation of a secondary cataract. The
medical evidence indicated that with a "discission" operation plaintiff's vision with the prescribed lenses would
return to 20/20. The court held that plaintiff's sight
was not irrevocably lost since it could be completely
or substantially restored by means of reasonably simple
surgery and the use of artificial lenses. In reaching its
decision, the court distinguished a Kentucky workmen's
compensation case which did not take into account the
effect of lenses, on the grounds that the workmen's compensation statute compensated for the "total and permane•nt loss of sight of an eye." (Emphasis added.) The
court reasoned that the term "permanent" did not require an attempt to recover sight, whereas the term

12
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"irrecoverable" requires that the insured make an attempt
to determine whether sight could be recovered through
glasses or surgery.

In Home Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Stewart, 114
F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1940), a policy of disability insurance insured against the "irrecoverable loss of sight in
both eyes." Plaintiff had developed cataracts in both
eyes and through surgery had the lenses of the eyes
removed. Wbile plaintiff's vision without glasses was
only 20/400, with glasses plaintiff had normal vision.
The Court reversed the lower court and held that plaintiff had not irrecoverably lost the sight of both eyes
within the meaning of the policy. The Court stated:

It is well settled in Colorado that in case of
doubt or ambiguity a contract of insurance is to
be construed in favor of the insured and against
the insurer. . . . But that rule does not go to the
extent of making a plain contract doubtful or
ambiguous and then interpreting it in favor of
the insured. Too, the natural and obvious meaning of the provisions in a contract is to be adopted
in preference to a fanciful, curious or hidden
meanmg.
The provision of the policy in question does
not insure against the loss of the lens or any
other physical part of the eye. It insures against
the loss of sight. The coverage is limited by the
plain language of the contract to the loss of function and does not embrace the loss of any part
of the physical eye. And the loss must be irrecoverable. Through a cataractous condition the insured lost substantially all of the sight in both
eyes. And it may be that under the law of Colorado he was not obligated to submit to surgery
13
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as a prerequisite to recovery upon the policy....
But we do not explore that question because with
commendable courage he voluntarily underwent
two operations for the removal of the lenses. He
wears glasses, and it is stipulated that with their
use he has normal vision. No case cited by the
parties or discovered through our own research
is squarely in point. But in Southland Life Ins.
Co. v. Dunn, Tex.Civ.App., 71 S.W. 2d 1103, recovery was sought upon a disability policy which provided that, without prejudice to any other cause
of disability, the entire and irrecoverable loss of
sight in both eyes would be considered as total
and permanent disability. Due to a cataractous
condition, plaintiff had suffered such impairment
of sight in both eyes as to prevent him from performing the substantial duties of any occupation
or labor, and his condition was permanent. But
the undisputed evidence was that through removal
of the cataracts by surgery, and the use of glasses,
the restoration of normal or substantially normal
vision could reasonably be expected. The court
held that the loss of sight was not irrecoverable
within the meaning of the policy, that instead it
was wholly or partially recoverable, and that in
either event recovery could not be had. That
case seems to bear analogous application.

*

*

*

Glasses are worn by a substantial proportion
of people of all ages. Many of them have very
little vision in the natural eye, but with the use
of glasses their vision is substantially nor:mal fo.r
all practical purposes. They pursue their businesses and professions with success .. ?1he-_v: meet
in competition those with normal yis10n m th.e
natural eye, and they are not seriously handicapped. It cannot be said that they ha:e ~uff~red
the irrecoverable loss of sight. Here it is stipulated that for the purpose of this case, the insured
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has normal '?-sion when he wears glasses. A court
cannot say m a single judicial breath that he
h~s ~uff ered the irrecoverable loss of his sight
":-thm the meaning of the policy and at the same
time that he has normal vision. The two are so
diametrically in conflict that they cannot be
brought into parallelism. The provision in the
contract embraces the loss of sight by atrophy of
the optic nerve or in some other manner which
is irrecoverable, but it cannot be reasonably construed to cover a case where sight was lost but
through surgery and the use of glasses normal
vision is again enjoyed.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

114 F.2d at 518.
In the case ref erred to in the above quoted material,
So1dhland Life Insitrance Company v. Dunn, 71 S.W.2d
1103 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), total and permanent disability was defined as the "entire and irrecoverable loss
of sight of both eyes." Plaintiff had a senile cataract
in one eye and a secondary cataract in the other. The
medical evidence indicated that both cataracts could be
rf'moved through a relatively simple operation without
pain or suffering and without any great risk to plaintiff's health and that in the vast majority of cases where
such operations were performed and proper glasses prescribed, the party's vision was either entirely or substantially restored. The lower court refused to give requested instructions concerning the questions of whether
plaintiff's vision could be restored through an operation
and whether a reasonable man would undergo such an
operation. Instead, the trial court apparently ignored
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the potential effect of surgery and glasses and asked
the jury to decide if plaintiff's impairment was "permanent," meaning "a lasting disability which will not pass
away." The Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that
the instructions were erroneous and remanded the case.
The Court stated:
The plaintiff's theory is that he has become
wholly and permanently disabled because he has
suffered the entire and irrecoverable loss of the
sight of both eyes by the development of cataracts.
The true fact issue is whe,ther he has suffered
the entire and irrecoverable loss of the sight of
both eyes.
If so, he has become wholly and permanently
disabled within the meaning of the policy. If the
loss of sight is not irrecoverable, then liability
on the part of defendant has not attached. This
is obvious under the terms of the policy.

Webster defines "irrecoverable" as "not to
be recovered, regained, or remedied; as, an irrecoverable loss."
An entire loss of the use of a limb or organ
of the body, which loss may be completely or substantially recovered, regained, or remedied, by
proper medical or surgical treatment and which
treatment would be undergone by an ordinarily
prudent person under the same or similar cir?umstances, is not to be justly considered as an irrecoverable entire loss.
It is either a completely recoverable loss or

a loss which is partially recoverable.

One who sustains a broken arm suffers the
entire loss of the use of such arm. If proper
treatment be not had, such loss may become irrecoverable, but no one would contend that a mere
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--?roken arm ordinarily constitutes an entire and
urecoverable loss of its use.
We can see no valid reason why one who
has suffered the entire loss of sight by cataracts
on his eyes is not governed by the same considerations. The evidence is certainly sufficient to
raise an issue as to whether an ordinarily prudent
person under such circumstances would undergo
an operation for removal of the cataracts. The
evidence also shows the loss of sight may be restored or substantially improved. In the one event
the loss of sight would be recovered; in the other
event it would be partially recovered, thus creating a partial rather than a complete disability.

In either event the plaintiff in this case could
not recover because under the terms of the policy
the loss of sight in both eyes must be "entire and
irrecoverable."
The assignments are sustained which complain of the refusal to submit the requested issues
indicated.
71 S.W. 2d at 1106. (Emphasis added.)

In another case, although not directly in point, the
effect of surgery and glasses was considered. In Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Compan;y v. Feldman, 99 F.2d
83 (6th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 636, 59 S.Ct.
485 (1939), the plaintiff was insured under a disability
policy if he became "totally and permanently unable to
i)erform any work or engage in any occupation or profession" or if he suffered the "irrecoverable loss of the
entire sight of both eyes." Because of cataracts, plaintiff's loss of vision was 93% o/o and 80o/o in his right and
left eye, respectively. Plaintiff's right eye was oper-
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ated on and he was fitted with glasses. Thereafter, he
had normal vision in his right eye. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the effect of the surgery and glasses should
have been considered by the lower court and that since
plaintiff's eyesight had been recovered, he had not been
permanently disabled within the meaning of the policy.
The court ruled that a verdict should have been directed
for the insurance company.
In each of the foregoing cases, the courts were construing private contract law and were not interpreting
a state compensation stature. In each case, the policy
contained provisions almost identical with the "total
and irrecoverable loss of sight" provision of the policy
in the instant case. In each, the court interpreted the
policy to mean that if lost vision could be restored by
surgery and by corrective lenses, recovery could not
be had. These cases are the only decisions directly in
point and represent the best reasoned view on the issues
presented in this case. This precedent should be followed
by this Court.
POINT IV
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION DECISIONS ARE
NOT AUTHORITY FOR THE ISSUES PRESENTED
IN THIS CASE.

The trial court and counsel for plaintiff have placed
emphasis upon the decisions of this and other courts
involving workmen's compensation cases. Admittedly,
this court has upheld awards of the State Industrial
Commission which have disregarded the effect of corrective lenses in the awarding of sums for total blindness.
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See Goodyear Service Store v. Industrial Comm'n 21
'
Utah 2d 249, 444 P.2d 119 (1968); Western Contracting
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 Utah 2d 208, 390 P.2d
125 (1964). Nevertheless, this precedent is not authority
in the instant case for the following reasons:
First, in both the Goodyear Service Store case and
the Western Contracting Company case, suprn, this
Court def erred to the findings of the Industrial Commission. In the latter case, this Court stated:
Whether the injury resulted in total blindness to the eye was within the prerogative of the
Industrial Commission to determine. Thev having so found under the evidence in the instant
case, we are not persuaded that they acted capriciously, arbitrarily, or unreasonably, in which
event the award must be affirmed.
15 Utah 2d at 210, 390 P.2d at 127. This language was
quoted in the Goodyear Service Store case as a justification for upholding the Commission's findings in that
case. 21 Utah 2d at 254, 444 P.2d at 122. No doubt
this result is motivated by the statute which provides
that the findings of fact by the Industrial Commission
are conclusive and final and are· not subject to review,
Utah Code Ann. ~35-1-85 (Repl. vol. 1966), since this
Court has also upheld a decision of the Industrial Commission which did take into account the effect of glasses
in fixing compensation for permanent disability. See
Moray v. Industrial Oomm'n, 58 Utah 404, 416-17, 199 P.
1023, 1028 (1921). The instant case involves no factual
issues and this Court is obligated to determine the legal
question involved. However, it should be pointed out
19
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that the standards for blindness and for industrial compensation were developed and promulgated long before
the present medical procedure was developed to remove
cataracts and to replace the injured lens of the eye
with a contact lens. (Deposition of James P. Rigg, Sr.
at 38.) Thus, the standard used by the Industrial Commission, which apparently ignores significant developments in medical science, should not be the standard
applied to the facts of this case involving a private
insurance contract which conditions payment upon prior
complete medical treatment.
Second, the specific language of the Utah workmen's compensation statute differs significantly from
the language used in the policy of insurance in this
case. Section 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated (Supp.
1969), allows compensation for "total blindness of one
eye." The insurance contract insures against the "total
and irrecoverable loss of sight of one eye." (Emphasis
added.) Thus, under Utah's workmen's compensation,
there is no requirment that blindness be "irrecoverable"
as well as "total." From a legal standpoint, blindness
may be complete or total at the time of injury and yet be
capable of being rectified or recovered through proper
medical treatment. See Wallace v. Insurance Company of
North American, 415 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1969); Reliable
Life Insurance Co. v. Steptoe, 435 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968). Certainly, the use of this additional "irrecoverable" requirement in the insurance policy so differentiates the basic structure of the policy from the
workmen's compensation statute that no valid comparison with the decisions interpreting the compensation
statute is possible.
20
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Of all the worlanen's compensation statutes in the
United States, only the statutes of Rhode Island and
West Virginia contain the language "total (or entire) and
irrecoverable loss of sight of one eye.'' Rhode Island
General Laws §28-33-19(d) (Supp. 1969); West Virginia
Code §23-4-6 ( d) (Supp. 1970). The statutes of the other
states are similar to Utah's in that they speak in terms
of "total blindness," "loss of an eye,'' or "loss of sight."
It is clear from the wording of the statutes1 that the
Rhode Island and West Virginia legislatures conceived
the phrase ''total (or entire) and irrecoverable loss of
sight" to mean a loss of sight that could never be restored
through surgery or lenses since each has made an additional provision for partial loss of sight Thus a comparison of the language of insurance policy in this case
with identical language of worlanen's compensation
statutes, demonstrates that plaintiff is not entitled to
recovery.
Third, even among the worlanen's compensation decisions interpreting the statutes of the other states, there
is a great unreconcilable conflict on the issue of whether
the effect of corrective lenses should be taken into account
in setting the award. See Lambert v. Industrial Comm'n,
411 Ill. 593, 104 N.E. 2d 783, 788-89 (1952); 58 Am. Jur.
I"For the entire irrecoverable loss of
the reduction to one tenth (1/10) or less
glasses, or for loss of binocular vision for
sixty weeks."
Rhode Island General Laws §28-33-19 (d)

sight of eith~r. eye, .or
[of] normal vision with
a period of one hundred
(Supp. 1969).

"Total and irrecoverable loss of sight of on~ eye shall ~ .con~idered
a thirty-three percent disability. For the partial loss of v1~1on m one,
or both eyes, the percentage_ of disability shall be de~pnmed by the
commissioner, using as a basis the total loss of one eye.
West Virginia Code§ 23-4-6 (d) (Supp. 1970).
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Workmen's Compensation §290, at 785 (1948); Annot.,
142 A.L.R. 822, 832-35 (1943); Annot., 73 A.L.R. 706
'
716-18 (1931); Annot., 8 A.L.R. 1324, 1330 (1920). Even
when the state statutes are silent on this issue, many
of the decisions have required as a matter of law that
the extent of vision impairment be measured only after
glasses or other corrective means are taken into account.
(See id.) It is submitted that if the requirement of irrecoverableness had been used by many of the legislatures,
most of the present conflicts in decisions would never had
occurred. If the effect of corrective lenses is such a
heated point under many workmen's compensation statutes that are silent on the effect of lenses, certainly this
Court should require the taking of lenses into account
when private, contracting parties provided for coverage
only if sight could not be recovered by any means.
And fourth, this Court in Western Contracting Corporation v. Industrial Commission, supra, recognized the
sharp conflict in the authorities on the question of
whether the effect of optical lenses should be considered
in determining awards under workmen's compensation
statutes. It was felt, however, that the Utah workmen's
compensation statute was among those statutes most favorable to the disregarding of the effect of corrective
lenses, especially since the legislature had provided for
reduced amounts of compensations for certain injuries
that allowed the use of artificial limbs but had failed
to make anv such distinction with respect to blindness.
See 15 Ut~h 2d at 209-10. Nevertheless, if the Utah
legislature had required the "total and irrecoverable loss
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-of sight" before a claimant could be compensated under
the act instead of just "total blindness," there is little
doubt that the result in the Wes tern Contracting Company case, supra, would have been different and that
the effect of corrective lenses would have had to have
been taken into consideration by the Commission as a
matter of law.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not suffered the total and irrecoverable loss of sight in one eye. With corrective lenses,
plaintiff enjoys normal vision. Under such conditions,
it would be anomalous to hold that plaintiff had suffered
the "total and irrecoverable loss of sight" within the
meaning of the subject insurance policy. If plaintiff's
sight is capable of being rectified through the use of a
contact lens, he is not entitled to recover under the
policy. The decision of the trial court should be reversed,
with orders that defendant is entitled to a judgment
against plaintiff dismissing the action with prejudice
as requested in defendant's Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Leonard J. Lewis
Roger H. Thompson
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attor-neys for Appellant
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